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I. INTRODUCTION
Success in a fraud action has traditionally required that a plaintiff
demonstrate reliance on a misrepresentation or omission by the de-
fendant. In securities fraud cases, however, where a plaintiff can
show that a fraud on the market has been perpetrated, a plaintiff may
rely on the integrity of the market price, as opposed to the misrepre-
sentation itself. The rationale for the fraud-on-the-market theory
(FOMT) is that in an efficient market, market prices reflect all pub-
licly available information quickly, completely, and without bias. As a
result, any misrepresentation that is not identified as false by market
participants is impounded into price. Even a plaintiff who does not
know of or rely directly on the false statements may be found to have
suffered a loss caused by the impact of the misrepresentation on the
market price.
Whether evidence in support of market efficiency is strong enough
to justify application of FOMT was debated by the Supreme Court and
endorsed in the landmark decision Basic, Inc. v. Levinson.' In writing
for the majority, Justice Blackmun explained that "[riecent empirical
studies have tended to confirm Congress' premise that the market
price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all publicly
available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations."2
In dissent, Justice White cautioned that the Court "embark[ed] on a
course that it d[id] not genuinely understand," and that "while the
economists' theories which underpin the fraud-on-the-market pre-
sumption may have the appeal of mathematical exactitude and scien-
tific certainty, they are-in the end-nothing more than theories
which may or may not prove accurate upon further consideration."3
Since Basic, there has been an explosion of literature in financial
economics casting doubt on the efficiency of at least some segments of
the stock market. The theory once characterized in 1978 by Professor
Michael Jensen as having "more solid empirical evidence supporting it
. . . [than any] other proposition in economics" 4 has undergone so
much questioning that leading researchers are now creating new theo-
ries to explain how, in equilibrium, market prices could reflect random
1. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
2. Id. at 246.
3. Id. at 254 (White, J., dissenting).
4. Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding Market Efficiency, 6 J.
FIN. ECON. 95 (1978).
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factors that have nothing to do with firms' underlying fundamental
values.5
This Article summarizes recent developments in research on mar-
ket efficiency and their implications for FOMT. The Article addresses
whether, with the benefit of several additional years of research, the
Supreme Court appears justified in relying on the efficient market hy-
pothesis articulated in Basic. A second issue is, assuming the courts
continue to rely on FOMT, how far should it be extended. One case,
Cammer v. Bloom,6 has specified rules that could be used to judge
whether a particular security is traded in an efficient market.7 These
rules, however, were suggested without the guidance of empirical evi-
dence on factors that explain variation in the degree of efficiency
across securities. Evidence presented here and in other studies sup-
ports the validity of some of the rules suggested in Cammer, but main-
tains that a smaller number of factors may be sufficient to
characterize the efficiency of a market.
Armed with the evidence on market efficiency and the validity of
the rules from Cammer, this Article illustrates the limits to the appro-
priateness of FOMT in one recent case, Biben v. Card.8 The Biben
case is especially instructive because it involves an over-the-counter
stock that was larger than some New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) stocks, and would have been
considered traded in an efficient market under at least one of the rules
specified in Cammer. Nevertheless, this Article argues that FOMT
would not have been appropriate in this case.
Part II of this Article offers a brief history of, and legal rational for,
FOMT and explains the relationship between the theory and the effi-
cient market hypothesis. The recent evidence on market efficiency is
summarized in Part III. Part IV presents new and previously-existing
evidence on the soundness of the rules of thumb suggested in Cammer
v. Bloom,9 and investigates additional rules as well. In Part V, the
Article examines the appropriateness of FOMT in the specific case of
5. See, e.g., J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98
J. POL. ECON. 703 (1990).
6. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
7. Id. at 1285-87.
8. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992). Biben was a
consolidated action involving multiple decisions by the court. For a history of the
reported decisions and the progression of the case, see Biben v. Card, 1991 Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 96,512 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 10, 1991); 1987 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) S 93,549 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 6, 1987); 1986 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,462
(W.D. Mo. 1986); 1985 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 92,083 (W.D. Mo. June 6, 1985);
1985 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 92,083 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 10, 1985). Biben settled
shortly before a hearing on the motion of Defendants Redd, Card, Jallow, Ira W.
Palmer, and William H. Palmer for partial summary judgment, based on the lack
of market efficiency and reliance.
9. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
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Biben v. Card.lo Conclusions and implications of the recent empirical
evidence for the proper scope of FOMT appear in Part VI.
II. HISTORY OF, AND LEGAL RATIONALE FOR, FRAUD-ON-
THE-MARKET THEORY
In 1988, the Supreme Court significantly changed the landscape of
securities fraud litigation when it decided Basic, Inc. v. Levinsonll
and finally put its imprimatur on FOMT. In Basic, the Court reaf-
firmed the necessity of establishing the reliance element of a claim
under Rule 10b-5: "We agree that reliance is an element of a Rule
10b-5 cause of action. Reliance provides the requisite causal connec-
tion between a defendant's misrepresentation and a plaintiff's in-
jury."12 The Court then held that in satisfying the reliance element,
"[i]t is not inappropriate to apply a presumption of reliance supported
by the fraud-on-the-market theory."13
The Court reasoned that "modern securities markets, literally in-
volving millions of shares changing hands daily, differ from the face-
to-face transactions contemplated by early fraud cases, and our under-
standing of Rule 10b-5's reliance requirement must encompass these
differences."'4 FOMT is one such way of dealing with these differ-
ences. 15 FOMT is simply a theory under which reliance may be pre-
sumed, thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant.16
This presumption of reliance, however, may be rebutted by showing
that (1) the market did not in fact impound the misrepresentations
into the price of the stock, or (2) the plaintiff would have traded the
securities even if he had possessed actual knowledge of the misrepre-
sentation and that he would not have relied on the integrity of the
market in any event.17 Where FOMT does not apply, actual and di-
rect reliance on the alleged misrepresentations is required. 8
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, a number of courts
adopted FOMT under the reasoning that an investor who purchased
securities on the open market may be presumed to have relied on mis-
representations by virtue of his reliance on the market price as an
accurate reflection of the security's value.i 9 In these cases, each of the
10. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992).
11. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
12. Id. at 243 (citations omitted).
13. Id. at 250.
14. Id. at 243-44.
15. Id.
16. See id. at 243-45.
17. See id. at 248.
18. Id. at 230.
19. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986); Lipton v. Documation, Inc.,
734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985); T. J. Raney &
Sons, Inc. v. Fort Cobb Irrigation Fuel Auth., 717 F.2d 1330 (10th Cir. 1983), cert.
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courts acknowledged in some fashion the conceptual underpinning of
FOMT: reliance may be presumed where all available information is
quickly and efficiently factored into the price of the security. For ex-
ample, in Peil v. Speiser,20 the Third Circuit noted: "The 'fraud on the
market' theory rests on the assumption that there is a nearly perfect
market in information, and that the market price of stock reacts to
and reflects the available information."21 Nevertheless, none of the
FOMT cases decided before 1988 examined the issue of how to deter-
mine whether the market for a particular security is efficient. In Peil,
for example, the court expressly declined to consider what markets are
efficient by stating: "While this presumption is plausible in developed
markets, it may not be in the case of newly issued stock. As the case
at bar involves a widely traded and established stock, we need not
consider whether we would apply the 'fraud on the market' theory in
other instances."22 In most FOMT cases, courts simply concluded,
without meaningful discussion, that the stocks involved either were or
were not traded in an efficient market. 23
In Basic, the Supreme Court narrowed the applicability of FOMT
when it adopted the Sixth Circuit's formulation of the elements of
FOMT:
(1) that the defendant made public misrepresentations; (2) that the misrepre-
sentations were material; (3) that the shares were traded on an efficient mar-
ket; (4) that the misrepresentations would induce a reasonable, relying
investor to misjudge the value of the shares; and (5) that the plaintiff traded
the shares between the time the misrepresentations were made and the time
the truth was revealed.2 4
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Basic, lower federal courts
have begun to recognize that an efficient market is a prerequisite to
application of the FOMT presumption. In Freeman v. Laventhol &
Horwath,25 the Sixth Circuit held that application of FOMT was inap-
propriate because "a primary market for newly issued municipal
bonds as a matter of law is not efficient."26 The Fifth Circuit held in
Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.27 that FOMT applies only "where the
subject securities were traded actively in large markets."28 In In re
denied, 465 U.S. 1026 (1984); Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981);
Shores v. Sklar, 647 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1102 (1983); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1975).
20. 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir. 1986).
21. Id. at 1161 n.10.
22. Id.
23. E.g., Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1132 (1985); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 906 (9th Cir. 1975).
24. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 n.27 (1988).
25. 915 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1990).
26. Id. at 199.
27. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988).
28. Id. at 1122.
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MDC Holdings Securities Litigation,29 the Southern District of Cali-
fornia held that "the Basic presumption is available only when the
securities have been traded on a free, efficient, and developed mar-
ket."30 In Cammer v. Bloom,31 one of the leading cases involving mar-
ket efficiency, the District of New Jersey held that the FOMT
presumption is available only when the plaintiff alleges and proves
that the securities were traded in an efficient market.32 In In re Bexar
County Health Facility Securities Litigation,33 the court stated clearly
the reasoning for the "efficient market" requirement:
The efficient capital market hypothesis states that the market's pricing mech-
anism will incorporate all relevant and material information into the market
price of a security. 3 4 Since the market is essentially treated as an agent of
the buyer for purposes of reliance on misinformation, the plaintiff must prove
that the market relied on the fraud. This entails a detailed inquiry into
whether the market for the stock is sufficiently active for the pricing mecha-
nism to function and, a priori, capable of being affected by the fraud. 35
Whether in fact stock markets are as efficient as believed at the
time of the Basic decision has been questioned in recent research in
financial economics. Moreover, even if one accepts that large seg-
ments of the market are efficient, it is still difficult to arrive at useful
and workable formulas for determining whether a given stock is con-
tained within those segments.
III. RECENT EVIDENCE ON MARKET EFFICIENCY
Financial economists have recognized for more than a decade that
stock price behavior deviated in systematic ways from expectations
based on existing theories. However, such anomalous evidence tended
to be dismissed as a reflection of shortcomings in theories of how
prices should behave in efficient markets, rather than as indications of
market inefficiency. More recently, challenges to the efficient market
hypothesis have been taken much more seriously. First, there devel-
oped a fuller recognition of how little power earlier tests had to detect
some classes of mispricing, even if the mispricing was large.3 6 Second,
a wave of research arrived that either identified new anomalous evi-
dence, or generated new evidence on previously-documented anoma-
29. 754 F. Supp. 785 (S.D. Cal. 1990).
30. Id. at 804.
31. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
32. Id. at 1290.
33. 130 F.R.D. 602 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
34. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empiri-
cal Work, 25 J. Fne. 383 (1970).
35. In re Bexar County Health Facility Sec. Litig., 130 F.R.D. 602, 606-07 (E.D. Pa.
1990).
36. See Lawrence Summers, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental
Values?, 41 J. FiN. 591 (1986).
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lies that made them difficult to explain except as a product of market
inefficiency.
The new evidence comes in several forms. One body of research
indicates that stock prices appear to underreact to accounting infor-
mation: not only financial statement details, but even information as
visible as earnings. 37 Another line of literature suggests that stock
prices overreact to other (unspecified) information.3 8 Related re-
search suggests that prices are influenced by the unpredictable opin-
ions of not-fully-rational investors, labeled "noise traders" in the
literature.39 This evidence has arrived against a background of nu-
merous other studies that document systematic patterns permitting
the prediction of future stock returns based on past stock returns, past
accounting data, and combinations thereof.
A. Underreaction to Earnings Information
Evidence suggestive of an underreaction of stock prices to earnings
information has existed since the late 1960s. 4 0 Academics, however,
found it difficult to believe that the market could underreact to infor-
mation as visible and widely followed as earnings, and tended to dis-
miss the evidence as the likely product of research design flaws.41
The recent evidence is more difficult to dismiss. Two studies on the
topic by market analysts Victor Bernard and Jacob Thomas present
evidence that the authors conclude can only be explained as "a dis-
turbing departure from what would be predicted by existing models of
efficient markets."42 In combination, the studies suggest that inves-
tors' interpretation of earnings news is "naive," that the initial reac-
tion to earnings is (on average) incomplete, and that stock prices
require six to nine months to complete the reaction to earnings news.
The magnitude of the delayed response is greater for small and me-
dium-size firms, but exists to some extent even for the largest third of
the firms on the NYSE and AMEX. The sluggish response to earnings
37. See infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
40. One of the first studies to document this was Ray Ball & Philip Brown, An Empir-
ical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. AccT. REs. 159 (1968).
41. See Ray Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities' Yields and Yield-
Surrogates, 6 J. FN. ECON., 103 (1978).
42. Victor L. Bernard & Jacob K. Thomas, Evidence that Stock Prices Do Not Fully
Reflect the Implications of Current Earnings for Future Earnings, 13 J. Accr.
ECON. 305, 307 (1990). See also Victor L. Bernard & Jacob K. Thomas, Post-
Earnings-Announcement Drift: Delayed Price Response, or Risk Premium? J.
AccT. REs., 1989 Supp. at 1. One indication of the widespread recognition of such
challenges to market efficiency lies in the designation of these two studies in 1993
as the "Notable Contribution to the Literature," an annual award sponsored by




news existed in every year examined (1971 through 1991), and was as
evident in 1991 as in any previous year.43 Overall, the evidence has
led even traditional defenders of market efficiency to modify their
views.44
B. Underreaction to Detailed Financial Statement Data
Bernard and Thomas raise a disturbing question: "[I]f market
prices fail to reflect fully the implications of information as freely
available as earnings, how well do they reflect information that is not
as well-publicized?" 45 Some recent studies suggest that the kind of
financial statement details that are the focus of fundamental analysis
are not fully reflected in stock prices. Two such studies test the ability
of a computerized fundamental analysis to predict future stock price
movements, based on information already available to the public.46
Even though the studies rely on purely statistical prediction models,
derived without any consideration of economic foundations, each ap-
pears successful in identifying publicly available information not al-
ready reflected in prices.47 Other studies have also found evidence
consistent with financial statement details not being fully reflected in
stock prices. 48
43. See Victor L. Bernard et al., How Sophisticated is the Market in Interpreting
Earnings News?, J. APPLMD CoRP. FiN., Summer 1993, at 54.
44. See Ray Ball, The Earnings-Price Anomaly, 15 J. AcCT. & ECON. 319 (1992). Ball
concludes that the evidence can be explained only as a market inefficiency, or as
an indication that the costs of processing information about earnings are sub-
stantial. However, with respect to the latter possibility, Ball notes how simple it
appears to be to take advantage of the earnings information not reflected in
prices, and adds that "[tihe case for substantial information processing costs as
an explanation of the anomaly is not clear-cut." Id. at 341.
45. Bernard & Thomas, Evidence that Stock Prices Do Not Fully Reflect the Implica-
tions of Current Earnings for Future Earnings, supra note 42, at 339.
46. See Robert W. Holthausen & David F. Larcker, The Prediction of Stock Returns
Using Financial Statement Information, 15 J. AcCT. & ECON. 373 (1992); Jane A.
Ou & Stephen H. Penman, Financial Statement Analysis and the Prediction of
Stock Returns, 11 J. AcCT. & ECON. 295 (1989).
47. Holthausen and Larcker document that the specific strategy adopted by Ou and
Penman does not produce excess returns in more recent years, and others have
also questioned the robustness of that strategy. See also Anthony C. Grieg, Fun-
damental Analysis and Subsequent Stock Returns, 15 J. AcCT. & EcoN. 413
(1992); Thomas L. Stober, Summary Financial Statement Measures and Analysts'
Forecasts of Earnings, 15 J. AcCT. EcoN. 347 (1992). The Holthausen-Larcker
strategy appears to be more robust, producing positive excess returns in every
year of the test period (1978-1988).
48. See John R. Hand, A Test of the Extended Functional Fixation Hypothesis, 65
AcCT. Rav. 739 (1990); Trevor Harris & James A. Ohlson, Accounting Disclosures
and the Market's Valuation of Oil and Gas Properties: Evaluation of Market Effi-
ciency and Functional Fixation, 65 AcCT. Rav. 764 (1990); Jeffrey S. Abarbanell &
Brian J. Bushee, Abnormal Returns Fundamental Analysis Strategy
(1994)(working paper, University of Michigan); Richard Sloan, Do Stock Prices
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C. Stock Price Overreaction to Information from
Unspecified Sources
While the research discussed above points to underreaction to fi-
nancial statement data, other research suggests the market over-
reacts to some unidentified information. Financial economists Werner
De Bondt and Richard Thaler find that stocks suffering extreme stock
price declines in the past tend to outperform those with prior extreme
price increases. 4 9 These reversals of past stock performance may be
interpreted as corrections of prior overreactions, which leads to the
conclusion that trading profits can be generated by adopting a con-
trarian strategy of buying past losers and selling past winners.
A number of studies initially questioned De Bondt and Thaler and
offered alternative explanations for the evidence.50 However, the
most recent research in the area concludes that "there is an economi-
cally-significant overreaction effect present in the stock market."53
The overreaction effect is weak or nonexistent for large firms, but is
indicative of gross mispricing for the smallest twenty percent of NYSE
stocks. Within that category, the evidence suggests that the combina-
tion of overpricing of past winners and underpricing of past losers is in
the range of fifty percent of the stock price. Since small firms tend to
be held primarily by individuals, whereas large firms tend to have a
heavy concentration of institutional ownership, the authors conclude
that "one interpretation of [the findings] might be that individuals
overreact but institutions do not."52
D. Influence of Investor Sentiment, or Other Factors
Unrelated to Fundamentals
Against the backdrop of continued questioning of market efficiency,
some financial economists have modeled stock prices as subject to in-
fluence by the unpredictable opinions of not-fully-rational investors,
Fully Impound Information in Accruals about Future Earnings? (1995)(working
paper, University of Pennsylvania). For further discussion and critique of the
Hand and Harris-Ohison studies, see Ray Ball & S. P. Kothari, Security Returns
Around Earnings Announcements, 66 AccT. REv. 718 (1991); John R. Hand, Ex-
tended Functional Fixation and Security Returns Around Earnings Announce-
ments: A Reply to Ball and Kothari, 66 AccT. Rpv. 739 (1991); Seha M. Tinic, A
Perspective on the Stock Market's Fixation on Accounting Numbers, 64 AccT. REv.
781 (1990).
49. Warner F. De Bondt & Richard Thaler, Does the Stock Market Overreact? 40 J.
F N. 793 (1986).
50. See Ray Ball & S.P. Kothari, Nonstationary Expected Returns, 23 J. FiN. ECON. 51
(1989).
51. Navin Chopra et al., Measuring Abnormal Performance: Do Stocks Overreact?, 31




labeled "noise traders."53 One widely read test of the theory was sup-
plied by Charles Lee and Richard Thaler in a study of the pricing of
small stocks and closed-end mutual funds.54 They conclude that stock
prices of these securities are influenced by random swings in "investor
sentiment," which are unrelated to the stocks' underlying economic
fundamentals.55
E. Other Evidence
Beyond the evidence discussed above, there is a large body of other
work demonstrating the predictability of stock returns based on vari-
ous bits of publicly available information, including historical price
data, financial statement data, and combinations thereof. The impli-
cations of the evidence are subject to debate, since it may be explaina-
ble even if markets are efficient.56 However, such predictability would
be expected if markets were inefficient. For example, Eugene Fama
and Kenneth French, who have argued that the tendency of firms with
low price/book multiples to outperform others may be consistent with
market efficiency, also acknowledge that the phenomenon could reflect
"the unraveling... of irrational market whims about the prospects of
firms."57 Furthermore, James Poterba and Lawrence Summers, hav-
ing documented the predictability of stock returns based on prior re-
turns data, argue that the evidence is difficult to explain except as the
53. De Long et al., supra note 5.
54. Charles M. Lee et al., Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End Fund Puzzle, 46 J.
FiN. 75 (1991). For additional commentary and discussion of this research, see
Nai-Fu Chen et al., Are the Discounts on Closed-End Funds a Sentiment Index?,
48 J. FiN. 795 (1993); Navin Chopra et al., Yes, Discounts on Closed-End Funds
Are a Sentiment Index, 48 J. FiN. 801 (1993); Nai-fu Chen et al., A Rejoinder, 48 J.
FiN. 809 (1993); Navin Chopra et al., Summing Up, 48 J. FIN. 811 (1993).
55. Lee et al., supra note 54.
56. Stock returns consist of a "normal" return, which varies with risk, and an "abnor-
mal return." The efficient market hypothesis requires that abnormal returns be
unpredictable, but permits normal returns to vary predictably, so long as the va-
riation is related to differences in risk. Thus, any finding that stock returns are
predictable based on some factor can be construed consistent with market effi-
ciency if the factor can be viewed as a proxy for risk. Whether any given factor
should be viewed as a proxy for risk is difficult to settle, since theories of how risk
should be measured-that is, capital asset pricing theories-are still incomplete,
with no single theory gaining general acceptance.
57. Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Re-
turns, 47 J. FIN. 427, 429 (1992); Josef Lakonishok et al., Contrarian Investment,
Extrapolation, and Risk, 49 J. FIN. 1541 (1994). Lakonishok et al., view the
anomaly as a market inefficiency, perhaps arising from behavioral and institu-
tional forces that cause investors to underprice "value stocks" and overprice
"glamour stocks." In contrast, S. P. Kothari, Jay Shanken, and Richard Sloan, in
Another Look at the Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns (1993) (working pa-
per, University of Rochester), suggest the anomaly may simply reflect a (not yet
documented) sample selection bias.
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product of "persistent, but transitory disparities between prices and
fundamental values." 5s
F. Summary
In summary, the efficient market hypothesis, once almost univer-
sally accepted within the academic community, has undergone numer-
ous challenges in recent years. While in some cases the recent
evidence is subject to alternative interpretations, it suggests that
prices appear to (1) underreact to earnings information; (2) underreact
to other detailed financial statement data; (3) overreact to information
from unspecified sources; and (4) be influenced by factors, such as "in-
vestor sentiment," unrelated to fundamentals. Beyond this, there is a
long line of literature that demonstrates the predictability of stock re-
turns based on a variety of factors.
The recent evidence has not caused outright abandonment of faith.
in market efficiency. The efficient market hypothesis still has its de-
fenders. For example, Professor Gene Fama, well known as the
strongest early proponent of the hypothesis, acknowledges the grow-
ing debate, but his 1991 review of the evidence is still largely sympa-
thetic to market efficiency.59 What has changed is that such views are
often questioned by other leading academics. Comparing the views of
twenty years ago with those of today, financial economist Richard
Thaler puts it this way:
The financial world as described in Eugene Fama's 1970 efficient markets sur-
vey was one... [where] markets were efficient, prices were unpredictable, and
financial economists did not know how to spell the word anomaly. Of course,
times have changed. As Fama says in his 1991 sequel, the issues have gotten
"thornier".... Indeed, the findings of the last two decades have been star-
tling ... These research findings, and the experience of the 1987 stock market
crash, have made financial economists more cautious." 60
Ironically, Thaler's 1970 review of Fama's theory has been referred to
in at least one case as "the leading academic study on the efficient
market hypothesis," in support of reliance on FOMT.61 If financial
economists are now more cautious in their acceptance of market effi-
ciency, then the courts should exercise more caution as well. At a min-
imum, the recent evidence suggests courts should carefully establish
guidelines for evaluating the degree of efficiency of the market for a
given stock. Note that nearly all of the anomalous evidence described
58. James M. Poterba & Lawrence H. Summers, Mean Reversion in Stock Prices: Evi-
dence and Implications, 22 J. FiN. ECON. 27, 27 (1988).
59. Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575 (1991).
60. ADvANCES IN BEHAVIORAL FINANCE, xvi (Richard Thaler ed., 1993).
61. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1280 n.25 (D.N.J. 1989).
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above is based on stocks on the NYSE and AMEX, so even trading on a
major exchange is no guarantee of market efficiency.62
While the evidence consistent with market inefficiency is often
based on NYSE and AMEX stocks, it is important to recognize that,
almost without exception, the inefficiencies appear characteristic of
primarily smaller stocks on those major exchanges, or by stocks with
little institutional following. Thus, even in light of the recent chal-
lenges to market efficiency, reliance on FOMT still appears justified
for the large stocks comprising the majority of listings on the major
exchanges. The important question is how one establishes boundaries
to the application of FOMT, which turns on factors driving the extent
of efficiency of the market for a given security.
IV. EVIDENCE ON FACTORS DETERMINING THE DEGREE
OF MARKET EFFICIENCY
The predominant literature in financial economics has not focused
on factors that explain the degree of market efficiency for a given se-
curity. The one factor that has been examined repeatedly-and which
appears related to the degree of efficiency in a number of studies-is
firm size, typically measured in terms of market capitalization.63 A
small number of studies suggest that market inefficiencies are greater
when institutional involvement is lower,64 and at least one study
shows that the speed of adjustment of security prices to new informa-
62. But see 3 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LEWIs D. LOWENFELS, SECURrTms FRAUD AND
COMMODrrIES FRAUD § 8.6, at 8:815 (2d ed. 1988). Bromberg and Lowenfels are
not persuaded that markets are inefficient:
We think that, at a minimum, there should be a presumption-probably
conditional for class determination-that certain markets are developed
and efficient for virtually all the securities traded there: the New York
and American Stock Exchanges, the Chicago Board Options Exchange,
and the NASDAQ National Market System.... For other markets a
presumption is harder to frame.
Id.
63. See Bernard & Thomas, supra note 42 (indicating that delayed stock price re-
sponses to earnings announcements are greater for small firms); George Foster et
al., Earnings Releases, Anomalies, and the Behavior of Security Returns, 59 AcCT.
REv. 574 (1984). A number of other anomalies also have been shown to be more
pronounced for small firms. Several studies have shown that excess returns cor-
related to strategies based on computerized fundamental analysis are largest for
small firms. Holthausen & Larcker, supra note 46; Ou & Penman, supra note 46.
See also Chopra et al., supra note 51 (finding that the overreaction effect is great-
est for small firms); Lee et al., supra note 54 (showing the impact of random fluc-
tuations in noise trader sentiment is decreasing in firm size). The predictability
of stock returns based on past stock returns is also more evident for small firms.
Fama, supra note 57.
64. See Chopra et al., supra note 51; Lee et al., supra note 54.
[Vol. 73:781
EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS
tion varies with the number of analysts following the security.65 A
recent study by Ravi Bhushan suggests that market inefficiencies are
greater for stocks with low trading volume and low prices. 66 Interest-
ingly, the low price varies inversely with percentage bid-ask spreads,
and is thus intended to proxy for transaction costs.
Case law has only once suggested specific criteria for evaluating
whether a stock is traded on an efficient market.67 Indicators of mar-
ket efficiency in Cammer were presumed to be: (1) large weekly trad-
ing volume, (2) significant analyst following, (3) numerous market
makers, (4) eligibility to file an S-3 Registration Statement, and (5) a
cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate events or
financial releases and an immediate response in the stock price.6S
The fourth factor, eligibility to file an S-3, is based primarily on firm
size, as measured by the market capitalization of the public float, and
share volume.
For purposes of establishing reliable guidance on the appropriate-
ness of FOMT for a given case, it is necessary to determine (1)
whether the factors suggested by Cammer are related empirically to
the degree of market efficiency, (2) whether other factors should also
be considered, and (3) whether some factors dominate others. This
Article introduces some new evidence on this issue and also summa-
rizes the results of two other recent related studies. The Bhushan
study, though it does not discuss FOMT, includes examination of sev-
eral of the same factors examined here.69 Another recent study from
the University of California-Berkeley focuses specifically on factors
determining the appropriateness of FOMT, as well as other factors.7O
The most important difference between the latter study and this anal-
ysis is methodological. Since the methodological difference affects the
measured relation between firm size and market efficiency, this Arti-
cle explains the difference later, in that context.
The approach used here (and in Bhushan) is to measure market
inefficiency in terms of the delayed stock price response to earnings
announcements. A larger delayed response is viewed as indicative of a
greater degree of market inefficiency. A regression analysis is used to
determine which factors explain variation in this measure of ineffi-
65. Michael Brennen et al., Investment Analysis and the Adjustment of Stock Prices
to Common Information (1994)(working paper, University of California-Los
Angeles).
66. Ravi Bhushan, An Informational Efficiency Perspective on the Post-Earnings-An-
nouncement Drift, 18 J. AccT. ECON. 45 (1994).
67. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989).
68. Id. at 1286-87.
69. Bhushan, supra note 66.
70. Brad M. Barber et al., The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory and the Determinants of




ciency across firms.71 The factors considered as potential drivers of
efficiency are as follows:
1. Firm size, as measured by market capitalization. This factor is
suggested by the literature in financial economics, and by the reliance
in Cammer on eligibility for S-3 registration.
2. Institutional holding, measured as the fraction of outstanding
shares held by institutional investors. Although not suggested in
Cammer, some of the research described above indicates mispricing
may be more severe for stocks traded primarily by individuals.
3. Analyst following. This factor is one of those listed in Cammer.
4. Percentage trading volume, measured as the average fraction
of outstanding shares traded within a week. Again, this factor is pro-
posed in Cammer.
5. Dollar trading volume. This factor was not suggested by Cam-
mer. However, economic logic suggests that it should be the dollar
magnitude of trading, as opposed to the percentage of shares traded,
that is related to the degree of market efficiency. Dollar volume is an
index of the magnitude of the economic incentive for traders to iden-
tify and eliminate mispricing.7 2
If higher values of the five factors lead to less market inefficiency
and thus smaller delayed responses to earnings, the regression coeffi-
cients associated with each should be negative. Below each coefficient
is presented a t-statistic, which provides an indication of statistical
significance. Under the classical assumptions underlying regression
analysis, a t-statistic would be less than -1.65 only five percent of the
time by chance. 73 Thus, t-statistics below this level provide confidence
that the associated factor is indeed important.
71. See Appendix, Table 1.
72. Two factors proposed in Cammer are not included here. One is the responsive-
ness of stock price to new information; that is a direct measure of market effi-
ciency, as opposed to a factor that determines the degree of market efficiency.
The other is the number of market makers for the stock. That factor is relevant
for dealer markets such as the over-the-counter (OTC) market, but not for the
NYSE and AMEX exchanges from which our sample is drawn. Barber et al. in-
vestigate the relationship between the number of market makers and market
inefficiency and find no statistically reliable evidence of a linkage. Barber et al.,
supra note 70.
73. One assumption of the ordinary least squares regression technique used here is
that the data are independent. Cross-sectional dependence in the data could
cause violation of this assumption. An alternative estimation approach that
deals with this issue involves estimating a time series of coefficients, one from
each quarter, and then calculating a t-statistic for the mean of this series, based
on its standard deviation through time. See Victor Bernard, Cross-sectional De-
pendence and Problems in Inference in Market-Based Accounting Research, 25 J.
ACCT. REs. 1 (1987). Results based on this approach are qualitatively similar to
those discussed in this study. Another potential dependence issue arises from the
overlapping abnormal returns (i.e., the return associated with each quarter's
SUE extends over six months). However, such time series dependence in the de-
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The left-hand side of Table One presents results when only one of
the five factors is considered at a time as a potential driver of market
inefficiency; on the right-hand side, all five factors are considered si-
multaneously. Simultaneous consideration of all factors is important
because a given factor might appear important in isolation, but could
still be dominated in the presence of factors that reflect similar
information.
A. Results When One Factor Is Considered at a Time
Each of the five factors is inversely related to the measure of mar-
ket inefficiency, and thus, the results are consistent with expectations.
Moreover, the t-statistics all indicate that the negative relations are
statistically significant.
The largest negative coefficient arises for percentage volume (-
.075), suggesting that if one were forced to select the single clearest
indicator of delayed responses to new information, percentage volume
would be the best choice. To obtain some sense of the economic impor-
tance of this and the other factors, consider that, for firms with low
percentage volume, the delayed stock price response to earnings in-
creases about eleven percent as one moves from the lowest decile to
the highest decile of unexpected earnings. (That is, by shifting from
the extreme bad news firms to extreme good news firms within the low
volume category, a trader could enhance the return on his portfolio by
eleven percent over the six months following the earnings announce-
ment.) The negative coefficient on percentage volume (-.075) indi-
cates that the eleven percent delayed stock price movement is
tempered substantially-by 7.5 percentage points-for firms with
high volume.74 Dollar volume, analyst following, and firm size are the
next most important factors, with impacts of 6.4%, 4.1%, and 4.1%,
respectively.
To the extent comparisons are possible, most, though not all, of
this evidence is consistent with that of the Bhushan and Barber stud-
pendent variable causes misleading t-statistics only in conjunction with time se-
ries dependence in the associated regressors. The product of the various pairs of
time-series correlations is not large enough to be problematic.
74. These statements are possible because of the way the regression is constructed
and because all explanatory variables are scaled from zero to one. See Appendix,
Table 1. For example, firms in the highest decile of the volume distribution are
assigned a value of one for PVOL, while those in the lowest decile are assigned a
zero. When PVOL is the only factor within the parenthesis in equation (3) and
that factor takes on a value of zero, then the delayed response to earnings is
measured by y7. The estimate of y, is 11%. When PVOL takes on a value of one,
the delayed response to earnings is equal to 71+y4. The estimate of 71+Y4 is 3.5%.
The difference between these two estimates, or g4, captures the difference be-
tween the low- and high-volume groups in their delayed response to unexpected
earnings. This difference is -7.5%.
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ies. Specifically, the result for size is consistent with Bhushan, and
the results for institutional holding, analyst following, and dollar vol-
ume are consistent with Barber. Neither Bhushan nor Barber ex-
amine percentage volume, and Bhushan does not investigate the role
of any factor other than size except in combination with other factors.
The Barber study obtains different results pertaining to firm size, but
that difference is traceable to differences in methodology.75
B. Results When All Factors Are Considered Simultaneously
Since some of the five factors may reflect the same underlying eco-
nomic phenomenon, it is important to discern which factor or factors
are most important when used in combination. The right-hand-side of
Table One indicates that only two of the factors-dollar volume and
percentage volume-offer significant explanatory power beyond that
of the other factors.76 The coefficients on dollar volume (-9.4%) and
percentage volume (-3.8%) indicate economically important reduc-
tions in delayed responses to earnings as one moves from low- to high-
volume stocks.77
That analyst following and institutional following are dominated
by other variables is interesting, since those are factors commonly be-
lieved to reflect the level of sophistication of investor following. Both
of these factors are correlated with firm size, and the presence of size
in the model is sufficient to eliminate their significance. One possibil-
ity is that firm size drives the level of analyst and institutional hold-
ing, and so it represents a more direct measure of investor
sophistication.
Even though firm size dominates analyst following and institu-
tional holding, it in turn is dominated by other factors, so that in the
full regression, it loses significance. Dollar volume appears to be the
75. In contrast to results reported here and in the Bhushan study, Barber et al. find a
statistically insignificant positive relation between size and their proxy for ineffi-
ciency. The inconsistency appears related to the way in which inefficiency is
measured. Barber et al. do not measure delayed responses to news directly, but
instead assume that a larger immediate (i.e., efficient) response to earnings news
is indicative of a smaller delayed (i.e., inefficient) response. However, prior re-
search suggests that even though the immediate response to earnings is greater
for small firms, the delayed response for such firms is also greater. The reason is
that news for such firms is less frequently anticipated in advance, so more of the
response occurs at the time of and subsequent to the announcement. See Bernard
& Thomas, supra note 42.
76. See Appendix, Table 1.
77. These coefficients can be compared to the approximately 11% difference between
the post-earnings-announcement stock returns for extreme good news and ex-
treme bad news firms with zero values on each of the five potential indicators of
efficiency. This amount is not reported in Table 1, but is the estimate of yj in
equation (3) of the appendix.
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factor most responsible for this phenomenon.78 Since both size (i.e.,
market capitalization) and dollar volume could reflect the magnitude
of the economic incentives to eliminate mispricing in a given security,
it is not clear, a priori, which factor should dominate. The results sug-
gest that such incentives are strong only when the potential trading
opportunities reflected by a large market capitalization are also evi-
dent in actual trading activity.
It is interesting that both percentage volume and dollar volume
assume significance in the full regression. Even though percentage
volume is the measure suggested in Cammer, the economic reasoning
underlying that measure is unclear. (The economic incentive to iden-
tify mispricing in stocks with little dollar volume is small, regardless
of what fraction of total shares that volume represents.) Note that
when important underlying economic variables are measured with er-
ror, other factors can contribute explanatory power, only because they
are correlated with the underlying variables. However, even if that is
the reason for the significance of percentage volume, the factor re-
mains useful unless more accurate measures of the underlying eco-
nomic phenomenon can be identified.
Again, the results can be compared to those of the Bhushan and
Barber studies. Bhushan does not consider percentage volume, but
consistent with the results here, finds that size, institutional holding,
and analyst following are dominated by dollar volume and a factor not
considered here-the level of the stock price. Some of the findings of
Barber differ from those in Table One, but the differences appear
traceable to their indirect approach to measuring inefficiency.79
C. Summary
As expected, each of the five factors-size, institutional holding,
analyst following, percentage trading volume, and dollar trading vol-
ume-are inversely related to the degree of market inefficiency. How-
ever, when all factors are considered simultaneously, the two volume
measures dominate.
These results should be interpreted carefully because they hinge
on a measure of market inefficiency based on one particular anom-
aly-delayed stock price responses to earnings announcements.
Other anomalies-such as the overreaction effect studied by Chopra,
78. Size is most highly correlated with dollar volume, and is significant unless dollar
volume is also included in the model.
79. In their full model, Barber et al. find a statistically significant positive relation
between size and their measure of inefficiency. See supra note 75 for an explana-
tion as to how their approach to measuring inefficiency could contribute to this
finding. Also, in contrast to our results and those in the Bhushan study, Barber,
et al. find that analyst following continues to retain significance even in the pres-
ence of other factors.
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Lakonishok, and Ritter, or the "investor sentiment" effect discussed by
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler-were specifically posited to be driven by an
absence of institutional involvement or analyst following. Thus, while
these factors were dominated by others in this study, they could re-
main important in other contexts. This possibility represents a fruit-
ful avenue for future research.
V. APPLICABILITY OF FOMT: A CASE STUDY
This Article illustrates the implications of the evidence reviewed in
Parts III and IV through examination of a particular case, Biben v.
Card.80 This case helps demonstrate the limitations to the applicabil-
ity of FOMT. While the security in question had a relatively small
public float, it was still larger than a significant fraction of NYSE/
AMEX stocks, and would have been deemed efficient on the basis of at
least one of the criteria suggested by Cammer. Nevertheless, for most
factors, including the ones most important in this empirical analysis,
the security achieved relatively low values. Examination of the stock
price behavior and circumstances surrounding the case seems to con-
firm that, in fact, the stock was not traded in an efficient market dur-
ing most of the class period.
The Biben plaintiffs filed a class action suit in 1984, alleging vari-
ous securities fraud claims under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Act of
1934, in connection with their purchases of the stock of The Midwest-
ern Companies ("Midwestern"). To satisfy the reliance element of the
claim, the plaintiffs alleged that they "relied on the integrity of the
market," thus invoking the FOMT.81
Midwestern was a Nevada corporation, headquartered in Missouri
and engaged primarily in the construction of power alcohol plants.
Midwestern stock traded in the over-the-counter market and was
quoted on the NASDAQ Interdealer Quotation system beginning July
22, 1982. Although 10.6 million shares of Midwestern stock were out-
standing, only about two million shares were held by public non-insid-
ers. The stock traded at $6 3/8 on November 2, 1982, the beginning of
the class period, and rose to its highest level, $24 1/2, on August 22,
1983. Plaintiffs alleged that the price increase was attributable to a
number of false and fraudulent information releases from the com-
pany or its public relations firm, including earnings announcements,
financial statements, and press releases. The price fell throughout the
period subsequent to August 1983, and closed at $2 3/8 on March 23,
1984, the end of the class period. In May 1984, Midwestern filed for
bankruptcy and the stock ultimately ceased trading.
80. 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992).
81. Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at 54, Biben v. Card, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
$ 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992)(No. 84-0844).
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Whether reliance on FOMT was appropriate in Biben rests largely
on whether the market for Midwestern stock was efficient. While the
evidence reviewed in Part II suggests inefficiencies may exist, they
should not be assumed to characterize any specific stock without fur-
ther detailed study. Nevertheless, the existing general evidence does
raise the possibility that Midwestern's stock price could have (1) over-
reacted to unspecified factors, such as rumors or excitement about
power alcohol production; (2) underreacted to earnings; and (3) under-
reacted to detailed financial statement data, such as cash flow data,
that would cast doubt on the quality of Midwestern earnings.
Some indication of the likelihood that the market for Midwestern
stock was efficient can be based, in part, on the previously discussed
determinants of market efficiency. One factor in Cammer on which
basis Midwestern stock could qualify for a presumption of efficiency is
the number of market makers. The number of market makers in Mid-
western stock ranged from four to ten during 1982-1983 and up to sev-
enteen during 1984. While Cammer suggests a threshold of five or ten
market makers, there is, however, no empirical support for reliance on
this factor. In the only empirical test available to date for this factor,
the Barber study concludes that the number of market makers is not
significantly related to the degree of market efficiency when placed in
competition with other factors.82 That study notes that in contrast to
analysts, market makers "generally do not analyze and disseminate
information about the stock that they make a market for and therefore
do not contribute to the efficiency of the stock's price."83 Market mak-
ers can behave this way because listing as a dealer commits one to
purchasing or delivering only a limited number of shares at the posted
quotes.
For factors other than the number of market makers, including
those factors that dominate in the empirical analysis of the previous
section, Midwestern assumed relatively low values until at least the
end of the class period. Table Two summarizes Midwestern's values
for such determinants, and compares them with the values for firms in
the NYSE/AMEX sample underlying the tests of Part IV.84 Specifi-
cally, the following four factors demonstrate Midwestern's market
inefficiency.
1. Dollar trading volume: Dollar volume was shown in Part III to
be the single most important explainer of market inefficiency, as prox-
ied by delayed responses to earnings news. During 1982 and 1983,
Midwestern's average weekly dollar volume was $0.2 million and $0.7
82. Barber et al., supra note 70.
83. Id. at 18.
84. See Appendix, Table 2.
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million, respectively.85 The 1982 dollar volume is higher than only
five percent of the NYSE/AMEX distribution, while the 1983 volume
exceeds that of seventeen percent of the distribution.
Since Cammer suggests reliance on percentage volume, not dollar
volume, it specifies no thresholds with which to compare the above
amounts for Midwestern. However, Midwestern's volume is clearly
low in 1982 and 1983, relative to NYSE/AMEX stocks. To provide
some sense for the implications, firms in our sample with dollar vol-
ume comparable to Midwestern's in 1982-83 had delayed (inefficient)
responses to earnings news that were, on average, about three times
greater than those with dollar volume above the ninetieth percentile.
By January through March of 1984, trading became much more active
for Midwestern, placing it above about one-third of the NYSE/AMEX
sample.
2. Percentage trading volume: During 1982 and 1983, Midwest-
ern's average weekly volume stood at 0.3% and 0.4%, respectively.
Such volumes are relatively light-well below the mean (1.2%) and
median (0.9%) for the NYSE/AMEX sample, and close to the tenth per-
centile (0.3 percent) of the NYSE/AMEX distribution. The volumes
are also well below the thresholds suggested in Cammer (one or two
percent) as indicative of efficiency. Thus, on the basis of one of the
factors indicated by the empirical analysis to be the clearest indicators
of market efficiency, the Midwestern stock appears to fall short of a
level necessary to support a presumption of efficiency.
By 1984 and through the end of the class period in March 1984,
volume increased substantially, averaging 3.3% overall and 6.7% in
March. Even the average level is sufficient to place Midwestern in the
top five percent of the NYSE/AMEX sample. On this basis, Midwest-
ern's volume had achieved levels sufficient to support a strong pre-
sumption of efficiency, according to Cammer. Note that it was during
this period that the stock price plummeted.
85. The dollar volume reported here (as well as percentage volume reported later) is
based on an estimated volume of shares. The estimate is equal to volume re-
ported by NASDAQ, multiplied by 57% to eliminate double-counting that occurs
in the OTC market. If a customer sells 100 shares to a market maker, who then
resells those 100 shares to another customer, the volume reported is 200 shares,
even though only 100 shares have changed hands, and even though the NYSE/
AMEX specialist system could handle the transaction as a single trade of 100
shares. This double-counting is exacerbated for OTC stocks when a single order
triggers inter-dealer trades. If in the previous example the 100 shares had been
passed from one dealer to another before the ultimate sale, the reported volume
would be 300 shares. The adjustment factor of 57% assumes that 50% of reported
volume involves net changes in the positions held by ultimate customers, and
that 14% of the remaining (inter-dealer) trades (i.e., seven percent of all volume)
represents inter-dealer trades that are not mere pass-throughs to other dealers.
The estimate was based on a sampling of Midwestern volume.
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3. Size: The market capitalization of Midwestern's public float
never exceeded $50 million, even with the price at its peak in August
1983, and averaged less than $20 million during the class period.86
These amounts are relatively low, compared with the mean ($193 mil-
lion) and median ($230 million) for our NYSE/AMEX sample; the av-
erage level of $20 million is approximately equal to the tenth
percentile of the sample distribution. Midwestern's public market
capitalization is also well below the level required to qualify for an S-3
registration ($100 million or $150 million, depending on trading vol-
ume), which is one of the criteria suggested in Cammer.
4. Analyst following and institutional holding: Midwestern had
no analyst following; the mean (median) number of security analysts
in our sample was eleven (nine), and more than 99% of the firms had
at least some analyst following. The fraction of Midwestern's stock
held by institutions ranged from zero to 0.6%-clearly very low rela-
tive to the mean (median) of 31% (29%) for our sample.
The above analysis suggests that on the basis of any of the factors
included in our empirical analysis, including those that dominated
when placed in competition with other factors, Midwestern main-
tained relatively low values during at least 1982 and 1983, or most of
the class period. Such low values suggest market inefficiency, and the
suggestion appears confirmed through a study of the stock's respon-
siveness to new information. Bromberg and Lowenfels propose that
"the presumption (that markets are developed and efficient) would be
rebuttable on a showing that the specific security in question is inac-
tively traded on the market or unresponsive to new information."s7
Cammer states that an immediate stock price response to unexpected
corporate events or financial releases "is the essence of an efficient
market and the foundation for the fraud on the market theory"88 and
suggests that "one of the most convincing ways to demonstrate effi-
ciency would be to illustrate, over time, a cause and effect relationship
86. The market capitalization for Midwestern is based on the public float, as opposed
to total outstanding shares. If firm size is related to market efficiency because it
measures the economic incentives for identification of mispricing, it is only the
shares available for public trading that are relevant. Alternatively, if firm size is
a proxy for liquidity, it is again only the public float that is relevant. Note that
this logic is consistent with the criteria for S-3 registration, which measures mar-
ket capitalization based only on the public float. The data available to us for the
NYSEIAMEX sample includes total market capitalization; the value of the public
float would be somewhat smaller for most firms, but the difference would not be
nearly as great as it was for Midwestern, for which 80% of outstanding shares
were held by insiders.
87. BROMBERG & LowENFELs, supra note 62, at 8:815.
88. Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1287 (D.N.J, 1989).
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between company disclosures and resulting movements in stock
price."89
Table Three summarizes a standard test of stock price responsive-
ness to news releases for MidwesternO that was presented to the
court in Biben as part of the motion for partial summary judgment
based on the lack of market efficiency and reliance.91 During 1982
and 1983, there were twenty-six press releases or published news sto-
ries about Midwestern. Only one of these is associated with a statisti-
cally significant stock price response during the surrounding three
day interval-and one would expect approximately one such occur-
rence to be observed at random, even if Midwestern's stock price truly
never responded to new information.92 The conclusion of the test for
1982 and 1983 is that there is no reliable evidence of stock price re-
sponsiveness to new information.
The above test was based on all press releases and news events.
An alternative test was also conducted, based only on corporate an-
nouncements that included sales forecasts, earnings forecasts, or sales
and earnings reports. The test indicated no statistically significant
stock price responsiveness to the sales and earnings information.9 3
At some time during 1984, reliable indications of stock price re-
sponsiveness to new information become evident for Midwestern. One
89. Id. at 1291. A note of caution is warranted in employing a test of stock price
responsiveness. Even if there is a "cause and effect relationship between com-
pany disclosures and resulting movements in stock price," the stock in question is
not necessarily priced efficiently, because the movements in stock price could be
"too large" or "too small." Id. However, the absence of any price response to new
important information is clearly inconsistent with market efficiency.
90. See Appendix, Table 3.
91. Biben v. Card, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992).
The statistical procedure used here is common in the academic literature. See,
e.g., Katherine Schipper & Rex Thompson, The Impact of Merger-Related An-
nouncements on Shareholders of Acquiring Firms, 21 J. AccT. REs. 184 (1983). It
involves estimating the linear relation between Midwestern's daily stock returns
and (1) the daily return on an OTC market index and (2) a series of "dummy
variables" that indicate whether a news event has occurred on the day of, the day
before, or the day after the stock return is observed. (In the cases of TV news
stories, where the timing could be identified more precisely, only the first trading
day after the evening news spot was included in the event interval.) If the news
event causes a detectable stock price response, that response should surface in
the form of a reliable statistical relation between Midwestern's stock return and
the dummy variable for the event.
92. The detailed results vary according to whether a single benchmark for "normal"
variance in the stock price is used for the entire period or whether it is allowed to
vary year-by-year. The results discussed here are based on the use of a single
benchmark. When the benchmark varies, the number of significant responses
rises to three (out of 37).
93. When the benchmark for "normal" variance in the stock return is permitted to
vary year-by-year, two of the seven earnings- or sales-related events are associ-
ated with statistically significant stock price movements.
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of the nine news events between January 1 and March 23, 1984, a
reaction to a Barron's article in early March, was large enough to be
considered statistically significant when viewed in isolation. That, in
combination with large stock price responses to some other events in
1984, indicates a statistically reliable degree of stock price responsive-
ness for that period. Especially in light of evidence reported previ-
ously on the changing characteristics of the Midwestern stock, the
responsiveness observed during 1984 appears consistent with the
market for Midwestern beginning to develop and become more
efficient.
The overall conclusion based on Table Three is that until 1984,
there is no reliable indication of stock price responsiveness to corpo-
rate events or financial releases. To the extent there is evidence of
responsiveness, it appears driven by events after February 1984.
There is no evidence during any year of reliable stock price respon-
siveness to sales or earnings information.
Table Four essentially reverses the process used in the above
test.94 Rather than beginning with known news events and then
checking for a stock price response, Table Four begins with large stock
price movements-more than twenty-five percent in either direction
within ten day-and then checks to see whether there are news
events to explain the price moves. The conclusion of the exhibit is that
until at least 1984, major stock price movements occurred at times
when there were no more publicly released corporate news stories
than would be expected at random. Moreover, some major price
moves occurred even when there was no public news.
The combined evidence in Tables Three and Four suggests that
Midwestern's stock price behavior was characterized by major moves
that are unexplainable based on public news announcements, that
Midwestern's stock price was not reliably responsive to corporate
news events until sometime in 1984, and that Midwestern's price was
never reliably responsive to corporate announcements about sales and
earnings. That view is consistent with the picture suggested by Table
Two: that Midwestern's trading volume, size, professional following,
and institutional involvement were relatively low. Evidently, they
were too low to produce an efficient market.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to explain the forces that caused
Midwestern's stock price to rise so dramatically during 1982 and 1983.
However, a possibility suggested by Tables Three and Four is that,
like the small stocks underlying the anomalies documented by
Chopra9 5 and Lee,96 the stock price experienced swings unrelated to
underlying fundamentals, perhaps because of over-optimism among
94. See Appendix, Table 4.
95. Chopra et al., supra note 51.
96. Lee et al., supra note 54.
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its traders about the firm and its position in the power alcohol indus-
try. At the same time, as was the case for smaller firms in studies by
Ou-Penman97 and Holthausen-Larcker,98 the price appears not to
have reflected financial statement details in the public domain. Pro-
fessional analysts who were approached by Midwestern for a potential
underwriting recognized quickly that, even though the firm reported
positive and increasing earnings, the firm had generated little or no
cash flow through operations, and appeared to be overpriced. A Bear
Stearns stock broker testified in his deposition:
Yeah, they (the Bear Stearns Corporate Finance Department) were suspect of
the ethanol business, the numbers, the short history of the company, the over-
valuation in the marketplace, just about everything you can possibly think of
negatively not to do a deal.... They did not regard that (the earnings) as real
at all .... It was all earnings and no cash flow. There is no cash flow. 9 9
A Paine Webber broker testified:
I recall a conversation with one of the people from Paine Webber who was in
New York commenting on how earnings were taken in on, I think, on the sale
of a plant prior to their actual receipt, the receipt of money, so this raised a
red flag to my people in New York. 100
Had the stock been traded in enough volume to attract some pro-
fessional following so that such views could have been communicated
to traders, the price might never have reached such high levels. In-
deed, when the Feschbacks, managers of the Texas-based short-trader
firm, began to examine the stock in the second half of 1983, they "were
real honed in on the numbers,"o1 and decided to sell the stock short.
This was the beginning of a process during which the stock attracted
more visibility (ultimately being covered by Barron's), generated much
higher levels of volume, and by sometime in 1984, might be labeled as
having traded in an efficient market-but at a much lower price.
In short, based on the various methodologies discussed above, it
appears that the dramatic rise in Midwestern's stock price occurred
while the market for the stock was not efficient. The Biben case set-
tled shortly before the hearing on the market efficiency issue.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Fraud-on-the-market theory (FOMT) is based on a hypothesis of
market efficiency that has increasingly come under attack in the fi-
nancial economics literature. While the hypothesis may represent a
97. Ou & Penman, supra note 46.
98. Holthausen & Larcker, supra note 46.
99. Deposition of Steven Antebi at 62-63, Biben v. Card, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992)(No. 84-0844)[hereinafter Antebi
Deposition].
100. Deposition of Sanford Mock at 74, Biben v. Card, 1992 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t
96,848 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 25, 1992)(No. 84-0844).
101. Antebi Deposition, supra note 99, at 74.
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good approximation of the behavior of large, actively traded stocks,
there is mounting evidence that, even within the NYSE and AMEX,
mispricing exists among the remaining stocks. One implication for
the courts is that even though FOMT still appears well justified for
most NYSE/AMEX stocks and many NASDAQ stocks, it may not be
appropriate for others; the importance of well-founded characteriza-
tions of the efficiency of a given security is thus paramount.
The empirical analysis conducted here suggests that trading vol-
ume-measured both in terms of dollars and as a percentage of out-
standing shares-provides the clearest indicator of market efficiency.
Firm size, analyst following, and institutional involvement are also
related to the degree of efficiency, although they are dominated when
placed in competition with volume and size. Since other studies have
suggested that, based on different measures of market efficiency, ana-
lyst following and institutional holding are important, they may still
be useful indicia, and this Article recommends continued reliance on
such factors pending further research. In contrast, there is no empiri-
cal support, and only questionable logical support, for the usefulness
of one other index suggested in the case law-the number of market
makers in the stock.
In the Biben case examined here, the security in question main-
tained relatively low values for those factors shown in the empirical
analysis to be good indicators of market efficiency, at least through
most of the class period. An examination of the stock price behavior
confirmed this view; until the end of the class period, the stock was not
responsive to corporate news, and took large swings at times when no
new public information became available. Analysis of the circum-
stances surrounding the case suggests that the stock price moved in
response to some unidentified forces unrelated to fundamentals, and
failed to reflect public information that professional analysts quickly
identified as negative.
The Biben case serves to illustrate the limitations to FOMT. Mar-
ket efficiency is a relative concept, and thus, it is inherently difficult to
draw a line between efficiently and inefficiently traded stocks. How-
ever, the stock in the Biben case appears to be one that is best charac-
terized as traded in an inefficient market. Given the current unsettled
state of research on market efficiency, courts would be well advised to
exercise caution in extending FOMT to other small, less actively
traded stocks-even among those on the NYSE, the AMEX, or the
NASDAQ's National Market System. Justice White may have been
correct when he observed in Basic that the court "embark[ed] on a
course that it d[id] not genuinely understand."102




Methodology Used to Identify Drivers of Market Inefficiency
We assume that a larger delayed stock price response to earnings
announcements is indicative of a greater degree of market inefficiency.
Regression analysis is used to determine which factors explain varia-
tion in this measure of inefficiency across firms.
The amount of delayed price response to earnings can be estimated
using the following regression:
POSTRETt = 80 + 8 t UXEARNjt + 4t (1)
where POSTRET = stock return for firm j, for the two quarters subse-
quent to the earnings announcement for quarter t, adjusted by stock
returns for an index of NYSE/AMEX firms in same size decile over the
same period;
UXEARN = unexpected earnings for firm j in quarter t, measured
as quarterly earnings minus the earnings of the comparable quarter of
the prior year, and scaled by the standard deviation of the same over
the prior five years; this measure is then converted to deciles within
quarters to avoid undue influence of extreme observations;
t = a random disturbance term.
If the response to unexpected earnings for a given firm is complete
and immediate, then stock returns subsequent to the earnings an-
nouncement would be unrelated to the unexpected earnings. In that
case, Bujt would be zero, and the post-announcement stock return
would be completely reflected in the random error, t. However, to the
extent the post-announcement return still reflects a response to the
unexpected earnings, Bjt would be positive. The larger is But, the
greater the delayed response to earnings, and the greater the assumed
degree of market inefficiency. This coefficient may differ across firms
and over time; it can be viewed as an index of the degree of market
inefficiency for stock j in quarter t.
At issue here are the factors which cause the measure of ineffi-
ciency, But, to vary across firms (and potentially, across time as well).
Our analysis allows Bljt to vary as a function of five factors, as indi-
cated in the following equation:
B3jr = y, + Y2SIZEjt + Y2IHjt + y3ANjt + Y4PVOIt + Y5DVOI5 t (2)
where SIZE = decile within year of firm size (market capitalization);
IH = decile within year of fraction of outstanding shares held by
institutions;
AN = decile within year of analyst following (number of analysts
following the firm);
PVOL = decile within year of average weekly trading volume, as percent-
age of total outstanding shares;
DVOL = decile within year of average weekly dollar trading volume.
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The key statistics in our analysis are the coefficients yj through yr.
They can be estimated by substituting (2) into (1) and estimating a
single regression:
POSTRET = So +
{y, + y2SIZEjt + y2IHt+ yoANjt + Y14PVOIjt + y5DVOLt} UXEARNjt + %t (3)
The coefficient y1 measures the amount of delayed response to a
unit of unexpected earnings, conditional on zero values for values of
SIZE, IH, AN, PVOL, and DVOL. If higher values of the five factors
lead to less market inefficiency and (thus) smaller delayed responses
to earnings, the coefficients on each (Y2 through yr) should be negative.
All factors are scaled so as to range from 0 to 1, and thus the coeffi-
cients on the factors can be compared directly to assess relative
importance.
The sample examined here is the same used in Bernard, Thomas,
and Abarbanell study,' 0 3 and covers most NYSE/AMEX firms for
1983-1991. Stock returns, market value, volume, and earnings data
used here were derived from the University of Chicago's CRSP files
and Standard & Poors' Compustat files. Data on institutional holding
was derived from the Spectrum files. The extent of analyst following
was drawn from the IBES files, furnished by the Institutional Brokers
Estimate System.




Factors Explaining Degree of Market Inefficiency,
as Measured by Delayed Response to Earnings News
Regression coefficients (t-statistics) when:
Each factor considered All factors considered
Factor individually: simultaneously:
Size (market capitalization) -.041 .040
(-5.75) (1.40)
Institutional holding -.039 .001
(-5.62) (.11)
Analyst following -.041 .014
(-5.84) (.974)
Percentage volume -.075 -.038
(-10.73) (-2.63)
Dollar volume -.064 -.094
(-9.08) (-2.65)
Explanation: results based on estimation of following regression equation (see appendix):
POSTRETJt = 00 +
{ y, + y2SIZEjt + y2IHjt+ "3ANjt + 4PVOLjt + t5DVOLjt } UXEARNjt + ejt
where POSTRET = stock return for two quarters subsequent to the earnings
announcement, adjusted by stock returns for index of NYSE/AMEX
firms in same size decile over the same period;
UXEARN = unexpected earnings (see text for details);
SIZE = firm size (market capitalization);
IH = fraction of shares held by institutions;
AN = number of analysts following the firm;
PVOL = average weekly trading volume as fraction of outstanding shares;
DVOL = dollar value of average weekly trading volume;
and all variables are measured in terms of deciles within years, relative to the
distribution for the NYSE/AMEX sample.
A negative coefficient on a given variable indicates that increases in that variable are
associated with less market inefficiency (as measured here). Under the classic assumptions
of ordinary least squares regression, t-statistics below -1.65 indicate that there is less than a
5 percent chance of having obtained such a large negative coefficient by chance, and thus




Indicators of market (in)efficiency for Midwestern common stock
Percentile of
Mean (median) Midwestern value,
Indicator of Value for for sample from relative to sample
(in)efficiency: Midwestern: NYSE/AMEX: from NYSE/AMEX:
Dollar volume* $0.2 mill in 1982 $21.4 mill 5th percentile in 1982;
(weekly): 0.7 mill in 1983 ($4.5 mill) 17th percentile in 1983;
2.0 mill in 1984
(through 3/23) 30t percentile in 1984
Percentage volume* 0.3% in 1982 1.2% loth percentile in 1982-
(weekly): 0.4% in 1983 (0.9%) 1983;
3.3% in 1984 97th percentile in 1984
Size (market $20 million, $1193 million l0th percentile
capitalization): on average ($230 million)
Analyst following: 0 analysts 11 analysts 0 th percentile
(9 analysts)
Institutional holding: 0.6% 31% 6th percentile
(29%)
*Volume estimates are equal to 57 percent o reported levels, to elimn ate the double-





Responsiveness of Midwestern stock price to new information
Tests of responsiveness of stock price to all news 1984
events, including earnings reports: 1982 1983 thru 3/23
Number of corporate news events: 9 19 9
Number of news releases accompanied by a
statistically significant stock price movement in
surrounding interval: 1 0 1
When events of year are viewed as a group, are
accompanying price movements significant? NO NO YES
Tests of responsiveness of stock price to sales 1984
forecasts, earnings forecasts, and earnings 1982 1983 thru 3/23
reports:
Number of news events: 2 7 1
Number of events accompanied by statistically
significant price movement in surrounding
interval: 0 0 0
When events of year are viewed as a group, are
accompanying price movements statistically NO NO NO
significant?
Explanation: Tests are based on regression of daily stock price movements (market-model
residuals) against dummy variables indicating event periods. Event intervals are three day periods
surrounding the news release, except for television news events, for which the interval includes
only the following trading day. (Results are similar when 3-day intervals are used for all events.)
Stock price movements are considered significant if there is less than a 5 percent probability of
observing such a movement by chance. Results are qualitatively unchanged when price





Relation between large Midwestern stock price movements
and corporate news events
1982 1983 1984
thru 3/23
Number of major price moves (greater than 25
percent change over any non-overlapping 10-day
trading interval)2: 4 3 3
Number of major price move intervals that
would contain news events, if price moves were
uncorrelated with existence of news
(specifically, if news events were distributed
randomly within years) 2 2 2
Actual number of major price move intervals
including at least one news event: 2 2 3
Number of major price moves that contain news
events with significant price movement during
surrounding three-day interval: 1 0
aWhere there is a series of overlapping 10-day price movements of more than 25 percent,
the movements analyzed here constitute the maximum number of non-overlapping 10-day
movements within the series; where more than one such set of non-overlapping
movements exists, the set with the largest total price movement was selected for analysis.
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